HF • Atomic Number 72

• History

  Hafnium was discovered in 1923 by Dutch physicist Dirk Coster and Hungarian-Swedish chemist George Charles von Hevesy. They identified it in zirconium minerals from Norway and Greenland by analyzing their X-ray spectra. The element was named after the Neo-Latin name for Copenhagen, Hafnia, the city where it was discovered.

  The discovery history of hafnium involved a long search. Dmitri Mendeleev had predicted in 1869 an element with properties similar to titanium and zirconium. Many scientists searched unsuccessfully, including Georges Urbain and Henry Moseley. Misinterpretations led to false claims of discovery, such as “Celtium” in 1911, which was later identified as lutetium.

  In the 1940s, the U.S. nuclear industry began using hafnium for control rods in nuclear reactors because, unlike zirconium, hafnium strongly absorbs neutrons.

• Application

  The largest application area for hafnium is the aerospace industry. It is used in superalloys for components such as engines and in the form of hafnium-containing coatings for high-temperature components.

  Another significant consumer of hafnium is the nuclear power industry. Due to its high neutron absorption cross-section and excellent mechanical properties, hafnium is used in control rods in nuclear reactors.

  Hafnium also plays a role in microelectronics and the semiconductor industry. In capacitors, hafnium is used as a high-k dielectric. It can replace silicon dioxide, enabling thinner insulating layers, which improves the performance and miniaturization of semiconductor devices.

  New findings regarding the properties of hafnium oxide suggest that these materials could play a key role in the development of new memory technologies. Due to the ferroelectricity of hafnium oxide, data can be stored for extended periods without power. These memory applications could pave the way for larger and faster computer systems by reducing the heat generated through continuous data transfer to volatile memory.

• Occurence, Mining and Extraction

  The most important minerals for the commercial extraction of hafnium are zircon and baddeleyite, which occur as by-products during the extraction of titanium minerals. In nature, hafnium is always bound to zirconium compounds and is difficult to separate.

  Due to the strong chemical similarity between hafnium and zirconium, separating the two elements from each other is very complex and expensive. The preferred methods for separating hafnium and zirconium are ion exchange and solvent extraction techniques. However, for some applications, separation of the two elements is not necessary.

  The main producing countries for hafnium-containing zirconium minerals are Australia and South Africa, where they are obtained from mineral sands and river gravels. By far the largest reserves are located in Australia.

  The Australian mining company Iluka Resources is the world's largest producer of zirconium ores, followed by the US company Tronox and the British-Australian mining corporation Rio Tinto.

  Framatome, a subsidiary of the French electricity company EDF, dominates the market for nuclear-grade hafnium. Allegheny Technologies Incorporated is the leading US manufacturer of hafnium for the aerospace and nuclear industries, producing highly pure hafnium for turbine blades.

  China National Nuclear Corporation is China's largest producer of hafnium.

  Chepetsky Mechanical Plant, a subsidiary of the state-owned corporation Rosatom, is an important Russian manufacturer supplying hafnium for the domestic nuclear and defense industries.

  In 2024, the global sales volume of hafnium (Hf) is estimated at around 80 tons; however, the exact quantity cannot be determined with certainty due to secrecy in the nuclear and military sectors.

  Developments in the electronics industry, increased investments in the defense sector, and the expansion of nuclear power plants are driving the growing demand for hafnium.

• Substitution

  In alloys, hafnium can be replaced by magnesium, cobalt, chromium, niobium, and tantalum. In certain superalloys, hafnium is interchangeable with zirconium.
  In control rods of nuclear reactors, boron or cadmium-silver-indium alloys can be used instead of metallic hafnium.

   

Conflict in Central Africa: The Dark Side of Global Electronics

For more than three decades, a devastating conflict has raged in Central Africa — one that, since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, has rarely made global headlines. In recent months, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has become increasingly tense. UN observers fear the region is on the brink of a regional war. Yet anyone using an electronic device is likely holding a small piece of the Congo in their hands — and, unknowingly, a link to this conflict.

The DRC is exceptionally rich in the very materials that power modern technology. It is one of the world’s leading producers of tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold — collectively known as the 3TG conflict minerals, as defined by the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation. Both laws were enacted in response to the decades-long Central African conflict. Since 2021, EU companies importing these minerals have been required to ensure due diligence in their supply chains, while U.S. companies have had similar obligations since 2010.

The World’s Largest Neglected Refugee Crisis

Eastern Congo is plagued by violence involving over 100 armed groups. Civilians face massacres and extreme sexual violence. The number of displaced people in the northeast alone has reached 5.5 million, making it the world’s largest neglected refugee crisis.

The provinces of North and South Kivu, bordering Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, are home to rich coltan deposits— the ore from which tantalum is extracted.

Tantalum is extremely rare and highly valued for its stability and heat resistance. Its primary use is in the electronics industry, particularly in capacitors, which store electrical charge on circuit boards — a key component in virtually every electronic device. About 60% of global tantalum production is used in electronics.

Tantalum is also essential for semiconductor manufacturing — a crucial factor as the U.S. tightens export restrictions on semiconductor products amid its technology war with China. The metal is further used in jet engines, where its heat resistance improves fuel efficiency, and in smartphones, where it’s found in RF filters in antennas.

Rising Demand for Tantalum

Market analysts expect growing demand for tantalum, both as an alloying element and due to 5G technology expansion. It may also gain importance as an anode coating in electric vehicle batteries. Because of its biocompatibility, tantalum is increasingly used in medical implants.

In 2023, the DRC produced about 980 tons of tantalum, mostly from North and South Kivu. The Congolese government, however, has lost control of vast areas in these provinces and blames Rwandan President Paul Kagame for supporting the March 23 Movement (M23) — a Tutsi-led rebel group that broke away from the Congolese army in 2012.

A UN expert report (December 2023) provides serious evidence supporting Kinshasa’s claims, alleging that Rwanda’s government supplies M23 with weapons, materials, and even regular army troops.

The DRC remains the world’s leading tantalum producer, with about 35% of the global market share in 2023. However, some reports suggest Rwanda may have surpassed its much larger neighbor that same year.

Rwanda Accused of Resource Plundering

The Congolese government has long accused Rwanda of plundering mineral resources in eastern Congo through the M23 rebels and smuggling them across the borders into Rwanda and Uganda — while the international community turns a blind eye.

According to Congolese Finance Minister Nicolas Kazadi, the country loses nearly $1 billion annually due to mineral looting. “Since Rwanda has few deposits of its own, it is obvious that everything comes from the DRC,” Kazadi told the Financial Times.

Rwanda denies all allegations. The U.S. and France have called on Rwanda in the UN Security Council to withdraw from Congo and end support for M23. Kinshasa, in turn, was urged to cease collaboration with militias that also commit atrocities against civilians. There is also evidence suggesting that rival groups cooperate in smuggling minerals.

Congo’s Legal Battle Against Apple

Congo’s President Félix Tshisekedi has been striving to draw international attention to the crisis. In late 2023, he hired an international legal team to explore a potential lawsuit against Apple, accusing the tech giant of using smuggled minerals from Congo in its products.

The lawyers sent a letter to Apple CEO Tim Cook in April 2024, to which the company has not yet responded — a silence the legal team interprets as a sign that Apple is reluctant to give precise answers.

Breakdown of Responsible Sourcing Verification

Apple’s compliance reports claim there is no evidence that its refiners of tin, tungsten, or tantalum directly or indirectly finance armed groups in Congo or its neighboring countries.

However, UN experts warn that coltan ores from Rubaya, a mining area in North Kivu, are being traded under ITSCI traceability tags — a system run by the International Tin Association meant to ensure that minerals are responsibly sourced.

According to the UN report, ores from Rubaya are also being smuggled into Rwanda. The ITSCI program suspended operations in North Kivu on April 30, 2024, after M23 rebels took control of the region.

While ITSCI tags are designed to ensure that mineral extraction in unstable regions does not fund armed groups, violate human rights, involve child labor, or encourage corruption, observers say the system is failing.

Mining in eastern Congo is largely artisanal, taking place in remote, unregulated areas with rudimentary tools. According to a 2022 EU-funded report, illegally mined coltan is often brought at night into “legal” mines to be tagged. Official ITSCI tags are also sold on the black market.

“Consumers cannot be certain about the origin of the tantalum in their electronic devices,” the report concludes.

Industry insiders have also criticized ITSCI for publishing data with a one-year delay and aggregating ore weights for the entire region rather than by country — making it impossible to verify whether Rwanda’s production truly comes from domestic mines or from smuggled Congolese material.

Tantalum Chart 2011 bis heute – Quelle: Screenshot: WWW.ISE-AG.COM

Bloody Conflict and Tantalum Mining Are Not Mutually Exclusive

Despite the renewed outbreak of violence in eastern Congo since late 2021, no significant disruption of global tantalum supplies or prices has occurred. In fact, history suggests the opposite: the conflict in eastern Congo has persisted almost continuously since 1994, yet tantalum production began to accelerate around the turn of the millennium. This coincided with the rise of Silicon Valley, the boom of the electronics industry, and the spread of mobile phones.

At the same time, Australia — previously the world’s main tantalum producer — withdrew from the market, as the metal was primarily obtained as a byproduct of lithium mining. This caused a sixfold surge in tantalum prices, sparking a small-scale mining boom in eastern Congo and establishing Central Africa’s central role in the global tantalum supply chain.[xxi]

By 2009, the coltan trade and mining sector in the DRC employed around 300,000 people. Other major producers include Brazil, Nigeria, and China, while Australia and Brazil together hold about 60% of the world’s known tantalum reserves.[xxii]

EU Support for Rwanda with Weapons and Money

How is it possible that, despite Western companies’ due diligence obligations, conflict minerals continue to find their way into everyday consumer goods?

One reason is that EU regulations only apply directly to importers of raw ores — i.e., refiners and smelters. Companies that process or manufacture intermediate or finished products containing these metals are only indirectly affected by the regulation.

Another issue, from an African perspective, is the financial and military support that Western countries provide to Rwanda. While Western governments publicly urge Rwanda to withdraw from Congo, they simultaneously supply the country with money and weapons.

For example, Poland sold weapons worth nearly €5 million to Rwanda in 2022. In return, Rwanda exported mainly tungsten and tin to Poland.[xxiii]

Currently, the European Union plans to provide Rwanda with €40 million in support. The funds are intended for non-lethal military equipment and air transport for Rwandan troops deployed in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province since 2021. There, Rwanda is helping to suppress the local branch of the Islamic State, which has disrupted the operations of French energy giant TotalEnergies.

TotalEnergies has been trying to develop a €20-billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in the region — a project that has faced repeated delays due to insecurity.[xxiv]

Rwanda had already received €20 million from the EU’s Peace Facility in 2022 for its military involvement in Mozambique.[xxv]

On August 15, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that export controls on antimony would take effect on September 15. This is the latest in a series of export restrictions by China, which dominates global mining and processing of rare earth elements.

Antimony is used in the production of flame retardants, lead-acid batteries, and as an alloy to strengthen other metals. It also has a range of military applications, including night vision devices, armor-piercing ammunition, and nuclear weapons production. China accounted for 48% of global antimony production in 2023.

Prices for antimony had already reached an all-time high of over USD 22,000 per tonne at the end of July 2024, having roughly doubled since the start of the year due to global shortages.

Concerns about tungsten supply

The recent announcement by China’s Ministry of Commerce regarding antimony has also sent shockwaves through the global tungsten supply chain. Tungsten is indispensable for a range of military applications, is extremely hard, and has the highest melting point of all metals. China currently dominates the export market for tungsten, producing about 80% of global supply. Some experts predict that China may introduce export controls on tungsten by the end of the year, if not sooner.

Both antimony and tungsten are included in the EU’s list of critical raw materials, with tungsten classified as a strategic raw material.

Background: China’s export restrictions in 2023

Just over a year earlier, on August 1, 2023, China announced export restrictions on the rare earth elements gallium (Ga) and germanium (Ge), and on high-grade graphite (C), citing “national security” reasons.

Germanium and gallium are used in solar products, fiber optics, and high-frequency chips for mobile phones and satellites. It should be recalled that Beijing imposed these export controls after the United States decided in 2023 to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors.

U.S. recognizes dependence on rare earths as a “national emergency”

As reported in a previous edition of this newsletter, former CIA Director and Secretary of State under President Donald Trump, Mike Pompeo, traveled to Barcelona in June 2023 to open the annual meeting of the Rare Earth Industry Association (REIA). Pompeo serves as a special adviser to USA Rare Earth (USARE). In September 2020, President Trump declared a national emergency over the “unacceptable dependence of the United States on critical minerals from foreign adversaries” — a thinly veiled reference to China. His successor, President Joe Biden, has continued this policy. There is concern that China could reduce or halt exports of critical rare earths if tensions over Taiwan or the South China Sea escalate into open conflict.

EU response: CRMA aims to reduce foreign dependence

The EU has also recognized the dangers of foreign dependence. “Lithium and rare earths will soon be more important than oil and gas,” emphasized European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her 2022 State of the Union address. “By 2030, our demand for these rare earth metals will increase fivefold,” she said. “As a result, we are witnessing a global race for the supply and recycling of critical raw materials.”

Strong words were followed by action. After more than a decade of study and consensus-building, the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which entered into force in May 2024.

The CRMA stipulates that by 2030, 10% of the EU’s annual consumption must be mined domestically, 40% processed domestically, and 25% of processing waste and end-of-life materials recycled domestically. The law also states that the EU must not source more than 65% of any strategic raw material from a single country.

Excitement over major rare earth discovery in Norway

The long-term CRMA strategy rests on four pillars, the first of which is mining. There has been a lot of media excitement about this recently. In June 2024, Rare Earths Norway announced the discovery of the largest known rare earth deposit in Europe. The deposit, known as the Fen Carbonatite Complex, is located at the southern tip of Norway on the site of an extinct volcano.

Contains key materials for electric vehicles and wind turbines

According to the 2012 Joint Ore Reserves Committee (JORC) Code, the Fen deposit is estimated to contain 559 metric tonnes with 1.57% total rare earth oxides (TREO) — equivalent to 8.8 metric tonnes of TREO with “reasonable prospects for economic extraction.” It also includes an estimated 1.5 tonnes of magnetic rare earths, which are used in electric vehicles and wind turbines.

There is also further upside potential. Current estimates for the rare earths are based on drilling down to 468 meters below mean sea level, while Norwegian geological sources suggest the deposits may extend to 1,000 meters below sea level.

While the scale of the discovery is significant, the key question remains how soon industrial-scale mining can begin and how long it will take before the deposit makes a meaningful contribution to Europe’s demand for rare earths and metals.

According to a Reuters report, non-EU member Norway could supply only about 10% of the EU’s rare earth demand by 2031.

Implementation challenges for other aspects of the CRMA

Besides mining, the CRMA has three other strategic pillars: processing, recycling, and supply diversification. There are challenges in implementing all of them.

Processing

The CRMA primarily targets rare earths such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium, which are used to produce magnets for electric batteries and wind turbines. However, there is a major loophole — imports of finished magnets made in China are not covered.

The company Neo Performance Materials is building a permanent magnet factory in Estonia that, within two to three years, is expected to produce 2,000 tonnes per year — enough magnets for about 1.5 million electric vehicles. Neo estimates its magnets would cost USD 20–50 more per vehicle than imported Chinese magnets. It remains unclear whether manufacturers are willing to bear these additional costs.

Recycling

According to Adamas Intelligence, in 2023 nearly 21,000 tonnes of permanent magnets were discarded in Europe — found in mobile phones, hard drives, electric vehicle traction motors, wind turbines, MRI machines, and hundreds of other applications. Currently, less than 1% of this amount is recycled annually. There is therefore still a long way to go before recycling meaningfully reduces foreign dependence on rare earths.

Supply diversification

The key question is how quickly alternative sources can be developed. Diversification requires careful consideration. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which exports 70% of the world’s cobalt supply, is politically unstable and poses a supply risk. Moreover, China owns 70% of the mines in the DRC.

Does the CRMA need a more agile fifth pillar?

As described above, there are significant obstacles to implementing the CRMA’s four main pillars. Another problem is timing — 2030 is still more than five years away. China’s recent decision to halt exports of the rare metal antimony within a matter of weeks — and predictions of further restrictions ahead — highlight the need for Europe to adapt much more rapidly to developments outside the EU.

For this purpose, it may be time to consider a fifth pillar of the CRMA. This would include two key elements:

First, an advisory body for EU policymakers, composed of experts from industry, research institutions, and government. This body would monitor both rapid developments and longer-term trends and issue concrete recommendations.

Second, the creation and maintenance of a strategic EU reserve of rare earths. This could involve targeted market interventions for critical raw materials, partly based on the advisory board’s recommendations.

It is clear that establishing and financing such a pillar to complement the existing CRMA strategy would require substantial effort. The author hopes that this article can stimulate further discussion and progress on this important issue.

Conclusion: Time for greater awareness of urgency

The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act represents an important step forward in protecting Europe from dangerous dependence on other nations for essential raw materials. However, as outlined above, there are challenges in implementing the CRMA. The 2030 timeline is also called into question by the increasing speed and scope of China’s export restrictions.

In short: Are we adapting quickly enough to the changing external environment to secure Europe’s technological and industrial future?

ISE AG – August 2024